Over thirty years, Britain and its Western allies dismantled their factories and shipped the machinery to China. Now the green energy agenda asks us to hand over control of our power supply to the same country. We traced the supply chain from mine to rooftop. What we found should alarm everyone.
In Part 2 we ran the numbers on two extreme energy futures. All-green hands global supremacy to China. All-fossil keeps it distributed. The conclusion was stark β but it raised an obvious follow-up: how on earth did one country end up controlling so much?
The answer didn’t happen by accident. It took three decades of deliberate choices by Western governments and corporations, each one individually rational, collectively catastrophic. Britain didn’t just lose its manufacturing sector. We packed it into shipping containers and sent it east, piece by piece, factory by factory, supply chain by supply chain.
And now we’re about to do the same thing with energy.
Three Decades of Industrial Surrender
The numbers tell a story that politicians on both sides would rather you didn’t hear:
| Metric | 1990 | 2000 | 2010 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| China’s share of global manufacturing | 3% | 7% | 19% | 31% |
| UK manufacturing as % of GDP | 22% | 17% | 12% | 9% |
| US manufacturing as % of GDP | 18% | 15% | 12% | 11% |
| UK manufacturing jobs (millions) | 5.1 | 4.2 | 2.9 | 2.6 |
| China’s GDP (trillion USD) | $0.39 | $1.2 | $6.1 | $18.5 |
Sources: World Bank, ONS, UNIDO, Bureau of Economic Analysis
Read that first row again. In 1990, China made 3 per cent of the world’s manufactured goods. Today it’s 31 per cent. That didn’t happen because China discovered some secret economic formula. It happened because we gave them our factories. The country that kicked off the Industrial Revolution now generates less than a tenth of its GDP from actually making things. Let that sit with you for a moment.
Nobody much noticed at first, did they? Cheap trainers, cheaper electronics β consumers were happy. The City was absolutely booming. Who needed factories when you had financial services pulling in billions? Then 2020 arrived, and suddenly we couldn’t make our own health equipment. Couldn’t build ventilators fast enough. Couldn’t even produce testing kits. That should have been the wake-up call. Most people hit snooze.
Inside the Green Supply Chain β Where the Money Really Goes
Follow any piece of green energy technology from raw material to your roof or your local wind farm, and you’ll hit China at almost every step. Here’s what that looks like in practice.
Solar Panels
| Supply Chain Stage | China’s Market Share | Next Largest Competitor |
|---|---|---|
| Polysilicon production | 80% | Germany 5% |
| Wafer manufacturing | 97% | Vietnam 1.5% |
| Cell production | 85% | Vietnam 5% |
| Module assembly | 80% | Vietnam 7% |
Source: IEA Special Report on Solar PV Global Supply Chains (2024)
Ninety-seven per cent. Sit with that number. That’s China’s share of solar wafer production β the critical middle step where silicon gets sliced into the thin discs that become solar cells. There is no Plan B here. No backup supplier waiting in the wings. Every solar panel going onto a British roof almost certainly contains a Chinese-made wafer, and the runner-up β Vietnam β manages a grand total of 1.5 per cent. It’s not even close.
Wind Turbines
| Component | China’s Market Share | Critical Dependency |
|---|---|---|
| Complete turbine manufacturing | 60% | Goldwind, Envision, Mingyang dominate |
| Permanent magnets (NdFeB) | 92% | Neodymium rare earth processing |
| Rare earth mining | 70% | +90% processing regardless of origin |
| Tower steel and castings | 55% | Lowest cost producer globally |
Sources: GWEC Global Wind Report 2025, Adamas Intelligence Rare Earth Market Review
You might think buying a Vestas or Siemens Gamesa turbine means you’re avoiding Chinese dependency. Think again. Crack open one of those turbines and the permanent magnets inside β the bits that make the direct-drive generators actually work β are 92 per cent Chinese-made. Those magnets need neodymium, a rare earth element that China controls from the hole in the ground right through to the finished product. Sure, you can mine it in Australia. But the processing? That still goes to China. Every time.
Batteries β The Achilles Heel
| Stage | China’s Share | What This Means |
|---|---|---|
| Lithium processing | 65% | Controls refining regardless of where it’s mined |
| Cobalt processing | 73% | DRC mines, Chinese-owned processors |
| Cathode production | 77% | Core battery chemistry |
| Anode production | 92% | Near-total monopoly |
| Battery cell manufacturing | 77% | CATL + BYD bigger than all Western makers combined |
Sources: BloombergNEF, IEA Global EV Outlook 2025, Benchmark Mineral Intelligence
Here’s the thing about renewables that nobody building them wants to talk about. Without batteries, the entire project falls apart. You can’t run a country on wind that blows when it feels like it and sunshine that clocks off at teatime. You need storage β massive amounts of it. And every single critical stage in the battery supply chain, from pulling lithium out of the ground to snapping the finished cell into an electric car, runs through China. One company alone β CATL β churns out more battery cells than every European and American manufacturer put together. Chew on that.
Now Compare That to Fossil Fuels
Oil. You can buy it from Saudi Arabia, America, Norway, Nigeria, Brazil, Canada, Iraq, the UAE β honestly, the list goes on and on. Gas? The US, Qatar, Australia, Norway, Algeria, and plenty more besides. Coal comes from six continents. No single country controls more than 20 per cent of any major fossil fuel commodity.
That’s not a coincidence β it’s geology. Nature scattered these resources around the planet, and the result is genuine competition. If one supplier starts playing games, you pick up the phone and call another. This market structure, messy as it can be, has underpinned Western energy security for over a century.
The green supply chain has nothing remotely like it. One bottleneck. One country. And that country has already demonstrated β more than once β that it’s perfectly willing to weaponise supply chains when it suits them.
How We Got Here β The Timeline
It started in the nineties. Britain jumped headfirst into offshoring, and at first it genuinely seemed clever. Textile mills shut their doors. Steel foundries went dark. Electronics assembly packed up and moved east. Government ministers couldn’t stop talking about the “knowledge economy” and the “post-industrial society” as though making things was somehow beneath us. By the time the decade ended, manufacturing jobs had already dropped from 5.1 million to 4.2 million. When China joined the WTO in 2001, the floodgates didn’t just open β they blew off their hinges.
The 2000s made everything worse, and faster. Tariff barriers vanished. Another 1.3 million UK manufacturing jobs disappeared β and these weren’t just trainers and toys anymore. Pharmaceuticals, automotive components, advanced materials: all heading east. By 2010, you could trace entire supply chains that existed only in China. Not a single link remaining in Britain. Not one.
By the 2010s we were genuinely trapped. Politicians started throwing around words like “rebalancing” and “reshoring,” but the dependency just kept deepening. British manufacturers who wanted to source components domestically couldn’t β because the supporting ecosystem had been bulldozed years earlier. Then COVID arrived in 2020 and proved the point with savage clarity. We couldn’t make PPE. We couldn’t build ventilators. We couldn’t produce test kits. All without Chinese supply chains, we were helpless.
And now? The pattern is repeating itself, only this time the stakes are higher. Britain’s green energy build-out β offshore wind, rooftop solar, grid-scale batteries, EV charging infrastructure β depends almost entirely on Chinese-manufactured components. We spent thirty years shipping our manufacturing capability to China. The green agenda now proposes to ship our energy independence there too, and in half the time.
China Has Already Weaponised Supply Chains
This isn’t some hypothetical scenario cooked up to scare people. Beijing has pulled this lever before β recently, repeatedly, and effectively.
Back in 2010, Japan got into a territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands. Beijing’s response? Cut rare earth exports to Japan. Prices spiked overnight. Japan backed down. Lesson taught.
Then in 2023, after Western nations imposed chip restrictions on China, Beijing hit back with export controls on gallium and germanium. Most people have never heard of either material. They’re critical for semiconductors and solar cells. That wasn’t coincidence β it was calculated retaliation, aimed precisely where it would hurt.
Graphite controls followed in 2024. Why graphite? Because it’s essential for battery anodes β the same anodes China already controls 92 per cent of. Each move was surgical, targeted, and devastatingly effective.
So here’s the question nobody in Westminster seems willing to ask: what happens when the country that makes your solar panels, your wind turbine magnets, and your batteries decides it has a grievance with you? What then?
What Green Energy Really Costs
Forget pence per kilowatt-hour for a moment. The true price tag of green energy isn’t on your electricity bill. It’s measured in something far more valuable: sovereignty. Can your country keep the lights on without having to ask permission from a geopolitical rival? Right now, the honest answer is that we’re building a system where we can’t.
Britain’s current green transition, the way it’s actually being built β not the way it’s talked about in press conferences β will create the deepest strategic dependency this country has experienced since we relied on American Lend-Lease to survive the Second World War. But here’s the crucial difference that should keep you up at night. America was an ally. We shared values, shared interests, shared enemies. The supply chain we’re building with China carries no such alignment. None.
In Part 4, Daniel Dabin sets out what Britain should actually do about all of this β a practical energy strategy that doesn’t require choosing between green fantasy and fossil nostalgia.
Follow the Supply Chain
8 questions
Key Takeaways
- China controls 80-97% of every critical stage in the solar panel supply chain
- 92% of permanent magnets essential for modern wind turbines are Chinese-made
- One Chinese company (CATL) produces more battery cells than all Western manufacturers combined
- UK manufacturing halved from 22% to 9% of GDP between 1990 and 2025 β 2.5 million jobs gone
- Fossil fuel supply chains are naturally diversified across dozens of competing nations β no single country above 20%
- China has already weaponised supply chains β restricting rare earths, gallium, germanium, and graphite exports
- The green transition replicates the manufacturing offshoring pattern but extends it to energy β our most critical infrastructure
What This Means for Kent Residents
Every solar panel on a Kent rooftop, every turbine visible from the Kent coast, every battery in every electric car on Kent’s roads β the components came overwhelmingly from one country. Kent once built ships for the Royal Navy, manufactured paper and cement, processed hops for the nation. Now we import the kit for our most basic need β electricity β from a country over which we have zero leverage. Knowing that is the first step toward changing it.
Sources: IEA Special Report on Solar PV Global Supply Chains (2024), GWEC Global Wind Report 2025, BloombergNEF, Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, World Bank Development Indicators, ONS UK Manufacturing Statistics, UNIDO Industrial Development Report, Adamas Intelligence Rare Earth Market Review.
Next: Part 4 β “Britain’s Energy Future β A Practical Path to Power” by Daniel Dabin proposes a realistic energy strategy for the UK.